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Sheldon Wolin, one of the most influential contemporary political theorists, 
died in 2015 at the age of 93. His remarkable legacy within political thought 
includes written works such as Politics and Vision and lives on as well in a variety 
of his former students, for instance, Cornel West and Wendy Brown. Wolin’s 
intellectual heritage is sure to persist, given that he “lived in the presence of time 
past, time present, and time future”2.This brief essay, however, does not seek an 
obituary tone3. Rather, I will comment on particular topics inherent to Wolin’s 
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2 Norton, Anne, “In Memory of Sheldon Wolin (1922–2015)” in Boston Review, November 2, 
2015, N/A: https://bostonreview.net/blog/sheldon-wolin-ann-norton
3  See, among others: Hedges, Chris, “Sheldon Wolin and Inverted Totalitarianism,” in Truthdig. 
Drilling Beneath the Headlines, November 1, 2015, N/A: http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/
sheldon_wolin_and_inverted_totalitarianism_20151101; Norton, Anne, op. cit.; Robin, Corey, “The 
Theorist Who Reached Across Time,” in Jacobin, October 24, 2015, N/A: https://www.jacobinmag.
com/2015/10/wolin-politics-and-vision-berkeley-machiavelli-democracy/; Kreitner, Richard, 
“Sheldon Wolin, 1922-2015,” in The Nation, October 30, 2015, N/A: http://www.thenation.com/
article/sheldon-wolin-1922-2015/; Grimes, William, “Sheldon S. Wolin, 93, Dies; Political Theorist 
Saw Limits of Popular Democracy,” in The New York Times, October 28, 2015, N/A: http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/10/29/us/politics/sheldon-s-wolin-theorist-who-shifted-political-science-back-to-
politics-dies-at-93.html. See, also: Markell, Patchen, “Unexpected Paths: On Political Theory and 
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interpretation of democracy by taking into consideration Bonnie Honig’s twofold 
rendition of it, centered on the paradoxical character of politics. The political 
paradox, understood as the ineradicable impossibility of identifying or producing 
the general will within politics, expresses the limitations of any essentialism, 
permeating every moment of political life –even beyond the event of new 
regimes’ founding4. Put differently, the paradox of politics is a rubric to name the 
ineluctable uncertainty inherent in democratic legitimacy. Honig distinguishes 
her understanding of the paradox of politics from the comprehension of 
paradoxes in deliberative or decisionist perspectives. For her, the potentiality of 
the paradox of politics is lodged in its attentiveness to the contestatory character 
of life-in-common. More specifically, she assumes that, insofar as the paradox 
of politics is animated by a plural way of dealing with the question of political 
origins and foundations, this paradox helps us criticize the imposition of binaries 
sustained in the form of “either-or”. In sum, according to Honig’s interpretation 
of the political paradox, “the people are always also a multitude, the general will 
is inhabited by the will of all, the law(giver) is possibly a charlatan, and political 
theorists’ objectivity is also partisan”5. In this light, Honig conceives Wolin, on the 
one hand, as a democratic theorist attentive to the paradoxical status of political 
life, given that, for him, political foundation “is not the opening chapter in a [B]
ildungsroman, but a pivotal moment in a tragic story of […] theft”, and, under 
this aegis, for him, “a democratic tradition built on practices now lost would be 
very different from the one we have”6. On the other hand, Honig asserts that 
Wolin insists “on democracy’s need for a slower and less plural tempo than that 
characteristic of our […] late modern world”7; that is, in a certain way, he limits the 
space of the political paradox. My reflections in this essay remain attentive to this 
History” in Theory & Event, Vol. 19, Issue 1, 2016, N/A; Marcus, David, “Into the Cave: Sheldon 
Wolin’s Search for Democracy,” in Dissent, Vol. 63, No. 1, Winter 2016, pp. 98-108.
4  On the political paradox, see, among others: Canovan, Margaret, The People, (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2005); Connolly, William, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), The Ethos of Pluralization  (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1995); Honig, Bonnie, Democracy and the Foreigner, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), “Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic 
Theory” in American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 1, (2007), pp. 1-17; Keenan, Alan, 
Democracy in Question. Democratic Openness in a Time of Political Closure, (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2003); Mouffe, Chantal, The Democratic Paradox, (London: Verso, 2000); 
Näsström, Sofia, “The Legitimacy of the People” in Political Theory, Vol. 35, No. 5, (October 2007), 
624-658; Rancière, Jacques, La mésentente. Politique et philosophie (Paris, Éditions Galilée, 1995). 
English translation by: Julie Rose, Disagreement. Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998); Ricoeur, Paul, “Le Paradoxe Politique,” in Histoire et Vérité, (Paris: Éditions 
du Seuil, 1964), pp. 260-284. English translation by: Charles A. Kelbley, “The Political Paradox” in 
History and Truth, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), pp. 247-270. See also: Connolly, 
William (ed.), Legitimacy and the State (New York: New York University Press, 1984), pp. 250-272.
5  Honig, Bonnie, “Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic Theory,” 
in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 1, (Feb., 2007), p. 14.
6  Honig, Bonnie, Emergency Politics. Paradox, Law, Democracy, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2009), pp. 34-35.
7  Ibid., p. 50.
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twofold status of Wolin’s theoretical enterprise that Honig detects: if one aspect 
of his vision is receptive to the unstable, contentious, and contingent character of 
democracy, another precludes the work of de-essentialization within the political 
realm by imposing rigid analytical dichotomies –for instance, between the body 
politic and political economy, revolution and constitution, or democracy and 
form– to understand it. Firstly, I will summarize the particular inflection that 
democracy acquires in Wolin’s work. In stark contrast to theories that hypostatize 
democracy and reinforce its condition of mere political regime  –that is, a set of 
norms, forms, or procedures– Wolin emphasizes its temporal and experiential 
character, one that is condensed in his notion of “fugitive democracy”. It is 
in this vein that Wolin affirms: “[D]emocracy is a political moment, perhaps 
the political moment, when the political is remembered and recreated”8. As a 
temporal experience, democracy remains discordant and unstable and is –or 
better, was and should be– (fugitively) instantiated by participation and voice. 
As is evident, Wolin’s conception of democracy attempts to avoid essentialism, 
both in form and substance. Secondly, I will evaluate whether Wolin’s theory 
accomplishes those challenges and desiderata regarding political essentialism by 
considering some critical remarks on Wolin’s vision of democracy provided by 
contemporary political theorists. In this light, I will show how the persistence of 
dichotomies is part and parcel of Wolin’s approach. My concern is whether such 
dichotomies in general can convincingly navigate the dilemmas of democracy, 
that is, of an experience based on ungrounded groundings, in which “political 
events and dramas exceed […] hypostatized categorizations”9.
1. Paradoxical Visions of Democratic Politics
In his seminal work Politics and Vision, Wolin elucidates why political 
theory cannot be comprehended as the deployment of an essence or an eternal 
nature of things. Rather, for Wolin, political theory should be understood as 
dealing with the plural meaning of political practice. This contingent character of 
politics opens up the space for the emergence of a paradox insofar as, according 
to Wolin, “politics is both a source of conflict and a mode of activity that seeks to 
resolve conflicts and promote readjustment”10. This incongruity, however, does 
8  Wolin, Sheldon, “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of Democracy” in Athenian Political 
Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy, J. Peter Euben, John Wallach, and Josiah 
Ober (eds.) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 55; and “Fugitive Democracy,” in Democracy 
and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Benhabib, Seyla (ed.) (Princeton: 
Princeton University press, 1996), p. 43. (Emphasis in the original).
9  Honig, Bonnie, “Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic Theory” 
in op. cit., p.14.
10  Wolin, Sheldon, Politics and Vision. Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 11.
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not belong to the political experience merely as an object of observation. To put 
it succinctly, it is political theory itself that enacts a paradoxical status, given 
that it implies a vision that is at the same time an act of description and an act of 
imagination, a reference to and beyond the empirical domain11. In virtue of this 
double attribute, one could argue that Politics and Vision advocates not only for 
a politics, but also for a political theory, that escapes the institutionalization and 
description of a status quo that precludes political contentiousness. Consequently, 
Wolin condemns the “penchant of modern political thought for converting political 
problems into administrative ones”12. This tendency is epitomized in an age of 
normalization that, according to Wolin, entails the diffusion of “the political” 
at the hands of “constitutional theory [that] is both a variant of organizational 
theory and a political methodology”13. I will elaborate more on this issue later. In 
the meantime, it is worth noting that even though these theoretical developments 
belong to Wolin’s magnum opus –which was published more than two decades 
before the articles I will discuss in this piece– they can help us perceive the 
manner in which he came to understand democracy later on by emphasizing 
its protean and fugitive character. More importantly, Politics and Vision might 
encourage us to ask whether the project of radical democracy needs to be based 
on pervasive antinomies.
Nicholas Xenos, Wolin’s former student, is certainly aware of the role 
that antitheses play in Wolinian political thought. He states that it is possible to 
recognize two phases in Wolin’s elucidation of the tension between democracy 
and form, a tension that itself configures one of the main examples of the use of 
radical contradictions to give an account of political life. During the first period, 
composed of texts published in the journal democracy, such as “The People’s 
Two Bodies” or “What Revolutionary Action Means Today”, as well as articles 
published in his collection The Presence of the Past, Wolin directly engages with 
the American experience. During the second period, comprising texts such as 
“Fugitive Democracy”, “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of Democracy”, 
and “Transgression, Equality and Voice”, Wolin focuses, according to Xenos, on 
the experience of Athens in the fifth and forth century BCE14. In general, to be 
sure, it is the democratic experience as a realm of instability, contention, and 
contingency that fuels Wolin’s vision. What needs to be expressed here, however, 
is that for Wolin democracy as theoretical problem remains linked to a vital issue 
that lies beyond empirical constraints, insofar as the United States grounded its 
11  Ibid., pp. 17-18.
12  Ibid., p. 314. 
13  Ibid., p. 392. On Wolin’s understanding of methodology, see: “Political Theory as a Vocation” in 
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 4, (Dec., 1969), pp. 1062-1082. 
14  For a distinction regarding the two phases in Wolin’s late approach to democracy, see: Xenos, 
Nicholas, “Momentary Democracy” in Democracy and Vision: Sheldon Wolin and the Vicissitudes of 
the Political, Botwinick, Aryeh and Connolly, William (eds.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001), pp. 25-38.
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collective existence on a model of power animated by an advanced economy 
which spread destructive effects: “The question”, Wolin states, “is about political 
identity, about who we are as a people”15. Wolin addresses that question by 
resemantizing Ernst Kantorowicz’s The King’s Two Bodies. According to Wolin, 
the American political tradition is the territory for the emergence of two kinds 
of collectivities: one politically active and democratic, called a body politic; the 
other almost entirely passive, antidemocratic, and defined by political economy. 
The Declaration of Independence and the Revolution of 1776 are the chief 
symbols of one body; the Constitution, The Federalist Papers, and Hamilton’s 
work in general are the salient motifs of the other. Put differently, American 
politics remains (in)animated by two bodies. While the first body “envisaged 
a being who would not just participate in politics, but would join in actually 
creating a new political identity, to ‘institute’, ‘alter’ or ‘abolish’ governments, 
to lay a ‘foundation’ and to organize power”16; the second produced a reaction 
against democratic and participatory politics and hypostatized the meaning of 
political collectivity through the persistence of state and political economy17.
Critics have observed Wolin’s tendency to consider “revolutionary people 
as wholly betrayed by the constitutional order, and persisting as an outside 
force”18. In this vein, revolution would seem to enact the energy of “the people,” 
and its legal framework would amount to depoliticization. This essential 
opposition, however, fails to observe a situation of double inscription of “the 
people”. In fact, despite what Wolin maintains, “it is not the constitutional 
people versus the revolutionary people […] but the relation of tension by which 
each sustains the other”19. This kind of argument re-positions the paradoxical 
status of politics, because “the people” remains simultaneously a constituted 
and a constituent power20. And a take on paradoxes, it is worth noting, might 
invite us to weaken Wolin’s tendency to rely on rigid dichotomies. 
From Wolin’s vision, nonetheless, an exceptional situation would seem to 
be sufficient cause to draw upon theoretical binaries. In particular, constitutional 
political economy jeopardizes the tradition of revolutionary politics by imposing 
15  Wolin, Sheldon, “The People’s Two Bodies”, in democracy 1, No. 1, (January 1981), p. 10. 
16  Ibid., p. 10. According to Wolin, “democracy means participation, but participation is not primarily 
about ‘taking part,’ as in elections or office holding. It means originating or initiating action with others”. 
See: Wolin, Sheldon, The Presence of the Past. Essays on the State and the Constitution, (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 150. See also: Frank, Jason, Constituent Moments. Enacting 
the People in Postrevolutionary America, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 153.
17  Wolin, Sheldon, “The People’s Two Bodies” in op. cit., p. 16. 
18  Frank, Jason, Constituent Moments. Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America, op. cit., 
p. 30. Interestingly, Andreas Kalyvas states that “Sheldon Wolin’s exaltation of an agonistic demos 
and a ‘transgressive’ democracy” is one of the chief disassociations of “the extraordinary from any 
reference to rules, procedures, or norms”. See: Kalyvas, Andreas, Democracy and the Politics of 
the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), p. 5.
19  Ibid., pp. 30-31. (Emphasis in the original).
20  Ibid., p. 31. 
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muteness. But it is precisely the task of elucidating “What Revolutionary Action 
Means Today” that faces the present silence, which “is a symptom of a crisis 
[whose] origins are in the one-sided conception of citizenship that was reflected 
in the Constitution”21 and which spread a notion of “the citizen” as a mere bearer 
of rights. The difference between the citizens and the members of interest groups 
is of particular importance to Wolin. In his own words, “the citizen, unlike 
the groupie, has to acquire a perspective of commonality, to think integrally 
and comprehensively rather than exclusively. The groupie never gets beyond 
‘politics,’ the stage of unreflective self-interest”22. This claim for commonality, 
to be sure, can be conceived as yet another expression of Wolin’s condemnation 
of politics as administration. As opposed to mere administrative processes, 
“the political”, according to Wolin, relies on a participatory democracy whose 
main aim is to enact a fight against the oblivion of the revolution. It should 
be noted, nevertheless, that Wolin envisions revolution as the possibility of 
creating new political forms, or better, “[of reinventing] the forms and practices 
that will express a democratic conception of collective life”23. The corollary of 
this theoretical maneuver within the conception of revolutionary politics as a 
creative moment is that citizenship entails the capability of generating power 
beyond the state’s paradigm.
Such an articulation of the state becomes crucial in Wolin’s The Presence 
of the Past. In this work, new dichotomies organize his vision: namely, the 
opposition between tending and intending, unum and pluris, or contract and 
birthright. Basically, “tending inclines toward a democratic conception of 
political life [and] intending toward an authoritarian conception [which] loves 
the principle of authority, that is, the right to command and enforce obedience”24.
As a result, the American tradition has actualized the hegemony of unum and, 
therefore, drowned the energy of pluris25. While the former tendency was 
imposed after the Constitution of 1787; the Revolution of 1776, according to 
Wolin, implied a feudal revolt against the centralization of power and helps us 
remember that “American history […] is a story of differences. It is a history 
that suggests that the true archaism is unum with its myth of a single people 
and a single narrative. And perhaps the supreme archaism is unum’s proudest 
21  Wolin, Sheldon, “What Revolutionary Action Means Today,” in Mouffe, Chantal (ed.), 
Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Citizenship, Community, (London: Verso, 1992), 240–253. [This 
article was first published in democracy 2, No. 4, (Fall 1982), pp. 17-28].
22  Ibid., p. 245. (Emphasis added).
23  Ibid, p. 249.
24  See: Wolin, Sheldon, The Presence of the Past. Essays on the State and the Constitution, op. 
cit., p. 88.
25  In this vein, Wolin affirms that: “The conflict between unum and pluris took the form of 
rationality versus difference, between national power based upon what The Federalist called ‘the 
new science of politics’ and the ‘imbecility’ of the constitutional system embodied in decentralized 
systems”. Ibid., p. 134.
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achievement, the state”26. Finally, while birthright calls for politicalness and 
citizens as interpreters, contract theory prefigures a memoryless person and the 
imposition of political economy and state. At this stage, however, I would ask: 
does Wolin’s reference to dichotomies do justice to his acute understanding 
of democracy as a dispute among plural meanings of political institution? Is 
it possible to establish a strict boundary between, for instance, the people’s 
two bodies, constitution and revolution, tending and intending, unum and 
pluris, birthright and contract? Do those rigid dichotomies not preclude the 
acknowledgment of the very paradoxical status of politics?
It seems relevant to emphasize the prevalence of antitheses in a second set 
of Wolin’s texts: “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of Democracy”, 
“Transgression, Equality and Voice”, and “Fugitive Democracy”. In the first 
of these essays, Wolin opposes constitution and revolution once again and 
asks: “[W]hen a democratic revolution leads to a constitution, does that mark 
the fulfillment of democracy, or the beginning of its attenuation?”27. Once 
more, Wolin considers that “constitutional democracy” implies the repression 
of democracy he sees at work in the legacy of Federalists28. Arguing against 
a history of political thought that indicates that democracy has collapsed 
because of its routinization, professionalization, and institutionalization, Wolin 
advocates a democracy understood as resistant to every form of rationalization 
and organization. In his words: “[I]nstead of a conception of democracy as 
indistinguishable from its constitution, I propose accepting the familiar 
charges that democracy is inherently unstable, inclined toward anarchy, and 
identified with revolution and using these traits as the basis for a different, 
aconstitutional conception of democracy”29. These ideas are inspired by the 
Greek experience of democracy as a politics of the demos30. The energy of that 
26  Ibid., p. 136. “For those who care about creating a democratic political life”, Wolin emphasizes, 
“a strong state must be rejected because the idea of a democratic state is a contradiction in terms”. 
See: Ibid., p. 149.
27  Wolin, Sheldon, “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of Democracy” in Athenian Political 
Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy, Euben, J. Peter, Wallach, John, and Ober, 
Josiah (eds.) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 30.
28  By constitutionalism, Wolin means “the theory of how best to restrain the politics of democracy 
[…]”. See: Wolin, Sheldon, “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of Democracy” in op. cit., p. 
35. On the impasses of constitutional democracy, see also: Brown, Wendy, “American Nightmare: 
Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization” in Political Theory, Vol. 34, No. 6, 
(December 2006), p. 696.
29  See: Wolin, Sheldon, “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of Democracy” in op. cit., p. 37. 
(The first emphasis is added, the second is in the original).
30  By taking into consideration Athenian democracy, Wolin argues that “the great achievement 
of self-government was to transform politics in sight and speech; power was made visible; decision 
making was opened so that citizens could see its workings; ordinary men personified power, spoke to 
it unservilely, and held themselves answerable. The most crucial and revealing element in Athenian 
democracy was the system of annual rotation in office, the lot, and the public subsidization of citizen 
participation. Rotation and lot both function to limit the effects of institutionalization: they are, 
paradoxically, institutions that subvert institutionalization”. See, Ibid., pp. 42-43. (Emphasis added). 
492 Facundo Vega
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 18, nº 36. Segundo semestre de 2016. 
Pp. 485-496.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2016.i36.21
kind of experience, however, was jeopardized by legalism, depersonalization, 
and objective normativity, which, in Wolin’s view, formed the core of a project 
that he calls “the constitutionalizing of surplus democracy”31. The temperament 
of this project remains connected to the proliferation of the notion of “form” 
that limits the revolutionary and excessive experience of democracy32. 
Interestingly enough for Wolin, democracy as the politics of the demos cannot 
be apprehended by any regime or form of government, but dwells in time and 
memory and, therefore, needs to be remembered, recreated, and renewed.  
The temporal and revolutionary conception of democratic politics that 
Wolin portrays and defends was fiercely limited by legal constraints. Through this 
contradiction, critics have also discussed Wolin’s use of dichotomies to enervate the 
Hamiltonian myth of America as a state centered on constitution. According to Xenos, 
for instance, “by pitting the revolutionary against the constitutional images of America, 
Wolin is propagating one myth against another, with political intent”33. This type of 
“mystical fiction”, which produces an elucidation of a political –and anti-political–
body, however, can amount to a metaphysical consolation and a mythic form-giving. 
One additional problem lies in Xenos’s perception of Wolin’s essentialism, whose 
“emphasis upon commonality would sometimes seem to promote the Community 
over communities”34. This essentialist temptation is also evident, Xenos emphasizes, 
in Wolin’s account of a political “renewal” that, paradoxically, is in tension with 
the momentary and transgressive status of democracy. That is, “to apply the term 
‘renewal’ to the appearance of the political is to imply an essential nature to the 
political that it does not have in Wolin’s conceptualization”35. In a nutshell, Xenos 
shows us not only the emergence of fixed dichotomies but also of allusions to natures 
and essences at work in Wolin’s account of democracy.
Democratic life, Wolin emphasizes, can be housed but not realized either 
by constitution or by a mere electoral process. In “Transgression, Equality and 
Voice”, particularly, he delineates a certain trajectory of democracy, taking 
as a modern starting point Spinoza’s notion of “multitudo” understood as a 
new political actor based on the concept of conatus. By observing the ancient 
experience of democracy through this lens, Wolin sheds light on the transgressive 
impulse of the Many36. This tendency is accompanied by a new conception of 
politics. In a meaningful way, then, Wolin suggests that “transparent politics 
31  Ibid., p. 47.
32  Wolin claims for the presence of “democracy [as] wayward, inchoate, unable to rule yet unwilling 
to be ruled. It does not naturally conform. It is inherently formless”. See: Wolin, Sheldon, Ibid., p. 50. 
(Emphasis in the original).
33  Xenos, Nicholas, “Momentary Democracy,” op. cit., p. 28.
34  Ibid., p. 33.
35  Ibid., p. 34.
36  Wolin, Sheldon, “Transgression, Equality and Voice” in Dēmokratia: A Conversation on 
Democracies, Ancient and Modern. Ober, Josiah and Hedrick, Charles (eds.), (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), p. 79.
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was the corollary of the revolutionary principle of full popular participation or, 
more precisely, of freedom understood as truly popular participation”37. The 
experience of ancient democracy and its conatus-driven bias, instantiated by 
the practice of collective action, emerges as the counterpoint to the system 
that Wolin calls electoral democracy. More specifically, Wolinian democracy 
requires the existence of “the people” as an actor. Yet, “[f]or ‘the people’ to 
become an actor, not simply an elector, more than will [is] needed: a voice 
[is] also required”38. It is precisely this experience that Wolin observes in the 
expression vox populi, vox dei and that, according to him, is lacking in the 
recent American context –a context defined by “a democracy without the demos 
as actor [that is, one where] the voice is that of a ventriloquous democracy”39. 
2. The Promises of Demos and the Political Labyrinth
Throughout this essay, I attempted to portray Wolin’s elucidation of 
democracy and his quarrel with electoral politics vis-à-vis the prevalence of 
exclusive polarities within his work. The epitome of this gesture is evident in 
“Fugitive Democracy,” a text in which it is possible to detect a new inflection 
of the praise for dichotomization that is at work in Wolin’s intellectual project. 
If in previous instances the opposition between constitution and revolution 
catalyzed Wolin’s understanding of democracy, in this case, the distinction 
between “politics” and “the political” animates his thematization of life-in-
common. While the former refers to “legitimized and public contestation,” the 
latter is connected to the emergence of moments of commonality and to the 
expression of the collective power40. “Politics”, Wolin claims, “is continuous, 
ceaseless, and endless. In contrast, the political is episodic, rare”41 and, as such, 
it constitutes the raison d’être of his democratic project. The state, according 
to Wolin, prefigures a domestication of “the political” through the imposition 
of boundaries. Consequently, the development of a purely constitutional 
scheme establishes a “democracy without the demos as actor”42, which is 
to say, a demos without voice. In stark contrast to the implications of such 
a dictum, Wolin’s democracy emerges from revolution and transgression of 
political forms. It follows from what has been said that “democracy is not about 
where the political is located but about how it is experienced”43. Revolution 
37  Ibid., p. 80.
38  Ibid., p. 86.
39  Ibid., p. 87.
40  Wolin, Sheldon, “Fugitive Democracy” in Benhabib, Seyla (ed.), Democracy and Difference, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 31.
41  Ibid., p. 31.
42  Ibid., p. 34.
43  Ibid., p. 38.
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as an experience gives its energy and sparks of commonality to democracy. 
Institutionalization, regularization, and administration of “the political”, by 
contrast, produce “the attenuation of democracy”44. In other words, democracy 
is devitalized by form and, as Wolin clarifies, becomes a fugitive moment. 
Its story is marked by its own disappearance, from the fall of Athens to the 
American and French revolutions. George Kateb takes into consideration this 
particular disposition of Wolin’s project to assert that the Wolinian democratic 
moment has no creative power45, which is why he affirms that there is a Sorelian 
tone in Wolin’s celebration of eruption for its own sake. According to Kateb, 
Wolin’s “passion is a noble passion, noble as it is futile. It is Marx’s passion, 
but because it is without Marx’s hope, it becomes Sorelian. The democratic 
energies of creation are redirected to destruction”46. And yet, would it be 
fair to say that Wolin is a kind of nihilist without any further explanation? I 
think that one cannot simply answer “yes” insofar as “fugitive democracy” 
is always already a project à venir. My concern, however, takes the form of a 
question: can that project and its nuances be apprehended only by (and through) 
dichotomies? Could not those oppositions instantiate a Maginot Line that goes 
through all of our political history and precludes taking into account democracy 
as the territory of a dispute?
In contrast to Kateb, Fred Dallmayr takes Wolin’s formulations on the 
fugitive character of democracy to open up a discussion on the transgressive or 
transformational inflection of postmodern democracy –informed by ontology–
for which he argues. As a critique of liberal-individualistic and republican 
collectivist models, Dallmayr delineates an understanding of democracy that 
rejects the constraints of the incarnation of sovereignty and collective identity. 
Under this aegis, he mentions Claude Lefort’s distinction between “the 
political” and “politics”, and specifies that “politics refers to overt, empirical 
political strategies while polity (or the political) denotes the constitutive, quasi-
transcendental matrix of political life; that is, the public space that allows 
for the mise-en-scène (or staging) of politics”47. This theoretical maneuver 
44  Ibid., p. 39.
45  Kateb strongly criticizes Wolin’s theorization of “fugitive democracy”. In his view, the notion of 
“fugitive democracy” entails a “no exit” attitude, one that remains “a sudden eruption of democracy 
that is doomed to subside and to leave the prevailing structures, nominally but not truly democratic, 
intact”. See: Kateb, George, “Wolin as a Critic of Democracy,” in Democracy and Vision: Sheldon 
Wolin and the Vicissitudes of the Political, op. cit., p. 39.
46  Ibid., p. 56. A re-elaboration of this rendition should take into account Wolin’s concern with 
the notion of “invocation”. “While vocation implies action, a practice, invocation may be said to 
imply memory and to enjoin recovery. Vocation predicates a certain commitment, ‘ideal’ though 
not disinterested, to the particular practice in question. Invocation is a response to a certain kind of 
loss”. See: Wolin, Sheldon, “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation,” in Vocations of Political 
Theory, Frank, Jason and Tambornino, John (eds.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2000), p. 5.
47  Dallmayr, Fred, “Beyond Fugitive Democracy: Some Modern and Postmodern Reflections” in 
Democracy and Vision: Sheldon Wolin and the Vicissitudes of the Political, op. cit., p. 66.
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attempts to limit every enclosure, embodiment, and essentialization of life-
in-common. Thus, Dallmayr states that in a “radical or modern/postmodern 
democracy […] the ‘people’ invoked in popular self-government […] is not 
a fixed or static identity but rather the emblem of human self-transformation 
and maturation, of the striving for self-rule that always remains a task and a 
challenge”48. What needs to be expressed here, however, is that on the one 
hand, Wolin would not support a project of postmodern democracy49. On the 
other hand, more importantly, it remains to be seen whether the productivity 
of ontology for understanding politics should be taken for granted50. The 
call for an ontological relevance of “the political”, it is true, could enervate 
proceduralism’s suppression of political contingency. The overstatement of 
“the political”, nonetheless, could produce a new essentialism, one sustained 
by the repetition of the ontologically extra-ordinary until its own collapse51.
According to my reading, the imposition of binaries that intend to capture 
political exceptions can actually jeopardize the very meaning of the non-
ordinary, hypostatizing the political realm. An Aus-einander-setzung with 
this question demands recalling Wolin’s most powerful lesson about radical 
politics: democracy is “a project concerned with the political potentialities of 
ordinary citizens, that is, with their possibilities for becoming political beings 
through the self-discovery of common concerns and of modes of action for 
realizing them”52. Wolin’s vision might serve as an invitation to observe that 
revolution and constitution, democracy and form, the politically ordinary and 
extra-ordinary are not mutually exclusive; rather, each actually dwells in the 
folds of the other. More significantly perhaps, similar to the recovery of a lost 
treasure, Wolin’s (in)vocations invite us to comprehend that politics cannot 
48  Ibid., p. 72.
49  “The pervasive presence of the state, the rise of technocratic elitism, the closely knit structure 
of state and corporate bureaucracies, and the decline of the ideology of egalitarianism in favor of a 
meritocracy,” Wolin suggests, “are the signs of a postmodern politics in which democracy serves 
primarily a rhetorical function with little or no correlative in official institutions or practices”. See: 
Wolin, Sheldon, The Presence of the Past. Essays on the State and the Constitution, op. cit., p. 81.
50  See: Bosteels, Bruno, The Actuality of Communism, (London: Verso, 2011), pp. 42-74. 
51  The entrenchment of “the political” associated with “the extraordinary” has a precedent 
in Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy. See: Jaspers, Karl, Nietzsche. Einführung in das Verständnis 
seines Philosophierens, (Berlin und Leipzig: Verlag Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1936), p. 224. English 
translation by: Charles F. Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz, Nietzsche. An Introduction to the 
Understanding of His Philosophical Activity, (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1965), p. 
251. Praise for “the political” is also evident in: Schmitt, Carl, Der Begriff des Politischen, (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot,1932). English translation by: George Schwab, The Concept of the Political, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007). Current repercussions of the difference between 
“politics” and “the political” are analyzed, among others, in: Marchart, Oliver, Post-Foundational 
Political Thought. Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007); Die politische Differenz. Zum Denken des Politischen bei Nancy, Lefort, 
Badiou, Laclau und Agamben, (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010).
52  Wolin, Sheldon, “Fugitive Democracy” in op. cit., p. 31. See also: Keenan, Alan, Democracy in 
Question. Democratic Openness in a Time of Political Closure, op. cit., p. 7.
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depend on the certainty of any form of organized domination. Politics, rather, 
resides within the mystery of the extra-ordinary and, more specifically, in its 
democratization –which is also, in part, a philosophico-political task53. 
53  “[M]editative culture”, according to Wolin, “nourishes all creativity. That culture is the source 
of the qualities crucial to theorizing: playfulness, concern, the juxtaposition of contraries, and 
astonishment at the variety and subtle interconnection of things”. See: Wolin, Sheldon, “Political 
Theory as a Vocation,” in op. cit., p. 1073.
